Hierarchical access control is an important and traditional problem in information security. In 2001, Wu et.al. proposed an elegant solution for hierarchical access control by the secure-filter. Jeng and Wang presented an improvement of Wu et. al.'s method by the ECC cryptosystem. However, secure-filter method is insecure in dynaminc access control. Lie, Hsu and Tripathy, Paul pointed out some secure leaks on the secure-filter and presented some improvements to eliminate these secure flaws. In this paper, we revise the secure-filter in Jeng-Wang method and propose another secure solutions in hierarchical access control problem. CA is a super security class (user) in our proposed method and the secure-filter of u i in our solutions is a polynomial of degree
Introduction
The access control problems in a computer (communication) system are structured as a user hierarchy. Under such a hierarchy, the users and their own data are organized into a number of disjoint set of security classes and each user is assigned to a security class called the user's security clearance. Let S = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n } be a set of n-disjoint security classes. Assume that "≤" is a partial ordering on S. In (S, ≤), u j ≤ u i means that the user u i has a security clearance higher than or equal to the user u j in the security class (S, ≤). In other words, the user u i can read the information items which belong to the user u j , but u j cannot read the data which belong to u i in this partial ordering system. u j is called the successor of u i and u i is called the predecessor of u j if u j ≤ u i .
The first solution of hierarchical access control problem is developed by Akl and Taylor [1] in 1983. They assigned a public integer t i to each security user u i with the property that t i |t j iff u j ≤ u i . The central authority (CA) in their scheme assigned a security number K 0 and the cryptographic key for u i is computed by K i = K ti 0 (mod p) where p is a large prime number. The predecessor u i of u j can obtain the cryptographical key K j by
Obviously, the user u i can obtain K j for some user u j if and only if u i is a predecessor of u j , that is u j ≤ u i . However, the size of the public information t i will grow linearly with the number of security classes in Alk and Taylor's scheme. Hence, MacKinnon et.al. [10] and Harn et.al. [7] presented different key assignment schemes to improve Akl and Taylor's method, respectively. However, all secret keys must be re-generated when a security class is added into or deleted from the user hierarchy in these methods. The dynamic access control problems cannot be efficiently solved.
Since then, several solutions [2, 3, 5] have been proposed to archive the target of the dynamic access control problem in hierarchy by keeping the size of public information as small as possible. However, these approaches are inefficient if the user with a high security of his successor without an immediate one. In 1995, Tsai and Chang [12] presented an elegant key management scheme based on the Rabin public cryptosystem and Chinese remainder theorem. Their method is efficient in the key-generation and key-derivation processes, but a group of secret data is required to be held by each security class.
Recently, Wu et.al. [14] proposed a novel key management scheme by the secure-filter function to solve the dynamic access control problems. The securefilter function that Wu et.al. used is defined as
for all u i < u t where s t is the secret number of u i and g i is a public random integer chosen by u i (see [14] for further details). In 2006, Jeng and Wang [6] presented an efficient solution of access control problem in hierarchy by combining the secure-filter and ECC cryptosystem. The secure-filter in Jeng-Wang method is given by
for all u i < u t whereÃ is a function from an elliptic group to Z * p (see [6] for the details ). The major advantages of Wu et.al's and Jeng-Wang schemes were to solve the dynamic key management efficiently. Both of them are not necessary to re-generate keys for all the security classes in the hierarchy when the security class is added into or deleted from the user hierarchy.
In 2009-2011, Lin and Hsu [8, 9] pointed out a security leak of the Jeng-Wang method. To eliminate this security flaw, Lin and Hsu revised the secure-filter to
for all u i < u t , where h is an one-way hash function and r is a random number. Lin-Hsu scheme is an effective secure method to overcome the security leak of Jeng-Wang method. However, this method must be re-computed the securefilter f i for each i when an user is added into or deleted from the hierarchy [8] . Tripathy and Paul [11] also proposed another attacked method on Jeng-Wang method in dynamic access control problem in 2011.
In this paper, we propose a novel secure-filter to overcome Lin-Hsu and Tripathy-Paul attacks. In our method, the CA needs to choose two addition random integers. One is a secure number n i and the other is a public number h i . We choose the secure-filter as
where L li is the cyclic l i -shift operator. Our proposed methods eliminate all security flaws of secure filter in Jeng-Wang method that we know and is efficient in dynamic access control. In section 2, we introduce Wu et.al. and Jeng-Wang key management schemes, the security leaks of Jeng-Wang method and Lin-Hsu improvement. We propose our method in section 3 and discuss the dynamic access control problem in section 4.
Preliminaries
Let S = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n } be a set with a partial ordering "≤". u i ≤ u j means that the user u j has a security clearance higher than or equal to u i . For simplicity, u i < u j means that the user u j has a security clearance higher than u i and u j is called a strictly predecessor of u i . Denote the set of all strictly predecessors of u i by S i = {u j |u i < u j , u j ∈ S} .
Definition 1. [14]
The secure-filter on K with respect to Σ = {s i |s i ∈ Z p , 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1} is a polynomial f with the indeterminate x over a Galois field GF(p) such that if s ∈ Σ, then f (s) ≡ K(mod p) where p is a public large prime.
In Jeng-Wang and Wu et.al.s' methods, CA publishes these coefficients a n−1 , a n−2 , · · · , a 0 of the general form of f ,
. Key generation phase -
(7) 5. Assign s i , g i and all coefficients of the general form of f i to u i ; u i keeps s i and K i private, and makes (f i , g i ) public.
Key derivation phaseConsequently, the predecessor u j of u i can compute g sj i from his secure number s j and the public number g i . Then the user u j obtain the cryptographic key K i by f i (g sj i ).
Jeng-Wang method[6] :
Initialization phase -1. CA randomly choose a large prime p, and a, b ∈ Z p with 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0. There is a group of elliptic curve E p (a, b) over a Galois field GF (p) that contains a set of points (x, y) with x, y ∈ Z * p satisfying y 2 = x 3 + ax + b(mod p) and a point O at infinity. Let G ∈ E p (a, b) be a base point whose order is a large prime q. 2. CA selects an algorithmÃ : (x, y) → v for representing a point (x, y) on E p (a, b) as a real number v. 3. CA publishes (p, q,Ã, E, G).
2. Each security class u i chooses its encryption key K i , a secret key n i ∈ Z q and a public key P i = n i G. 3. u i chooses a random integer k and encrypts (K i , n i ) as a ciphertext {kG, (K i , n i ) + kP ca }, and sends this ciphertext to CA. 4. CA decrypts {kG, (K i , n i )+kP ca } to obtain (K i , n i ) by the equation
5. CA generate the secure-filter
key derivation phaseWhen u j is a predecessor of u i , u j can use the secure key n j , the public key P i and the public secure-filter f i to derive
Two attacks on Jeng-Wang method
Both of above solutions are secure in a static hierarchical system, it means that no user is added into or deleted from S. However, these schemes are insecure when a user joins or removes from the hierarchy. Two different attacks on Jeng-Wang method have be presented. We discuss these attacks on the JengWang method (and the Wu et. al.'s method) in this subsection. For simplicity, we denote the secure-filter f i (x) of a security class u i as
The value c i,j plays the same role as g
Lin-Hsu attack [8, 9] :
Without lose of the generality, we only consider the situation that there is a new security class joining in hierarchy. Let u i be a security class (user) in S, S i = {u j |u i < u j and u j ∈ S} be the set of strictly predecessors of u i and u N be a new predecessor of u i . Assume that
is the secure-filter of u i in the original hierarchy and
is the new secure-filter in the new hierarchy after u N is inserted.
One has
Obviously, c i,1 · · · c i,Ni are the solutions off i (x)−f i (x) = 0. The adversary can obtain c i,j for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N i } by solving the equation (f i − f i )(x) = 0, and then get the encryption key
Tripathy-Paul attack [11] : In 2011, Tripathy and Paul pointed out another attack on Jeng-Wang method. With the assumptions in Lin-Hsu attack, the general form of the secure-filters f i (x) andf i (x) are
respectively. Since
and α j , β k for each j, k are public information, the adversary can obtain c i,N by subtracting β Ni from α Ni−1 , and the encryption key K i =f i (c i,N ).
Lin-Hsu improvement
Lin and Hsu [8, 9] presented an improvement of Jeng-Wang scheme. They used a random number r and an one-way hash function h(·) replacing (Ã(n j P i ), K i ) in Jeng-Wang scheme with (h(r Ã (n j P i )), K i ). That is, the value c i,j in Eq.(10) for each j should be changed when a security class is added in or deleted from in hierarchy. This implies thatÃ(n j P i ) is not solution off i (x) − f i (x) = 0 anymore. Hence, this method eliminates the security flaw on Jeng-Wang method effectively (see [8, 9] for the details).
Our proposed method
First, let us introduce some definitions and properties of the cyclic l-shift operator.
Definition 2. Let b be a positive integer greater than 1. The radix (base) b expansion of a positive integer k is a unique expansion of k as
where k i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , b − 1} for each i and k m+1 = 0. This expansion is written
The integer k i is called the i-th coefficient of the radix b expansion of k, whereas k m+1 is the leading coefficient of the radix b expansion of k.
Definition 3. Let b be a positive integer greater than 1 and l be an integer.
where (k m+1 k m · · · k 1 ) b is the radix b expansion of n and σ = (1, 2, · · · , m) is the m-cyclic in the symmetric group S m of degree m.
Proposition
This implies that
Hence,
in Z * 239 . Now, we discuss our solution of the access control in hierarchy. In our method, CA is a super security class which should choose a secrete integer h i and a public integer l i for each secure-filter f i . Let L l (x) be a cyclic l-shift operator. Then the secure-filter in our proposed method is given by
where a i,j plays the same role asÃ(n j P i ) in Jeng-Wang method.
Method 1: (Revised Jeng-Wang method)
Initialization phase -1. CA randomly chooses a small positive integer d greater than 1, a large prime p, and a, b ∈ Z * p satisfying that 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0 Let E p (a, b) be an elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b (mod p) over a Galois field GF (p) containing a set of points (x, y) with x, y ∈ Z * p and a point O at infinity. CA selects a base point G of E p (a, b) whose order is a large prime q. 2. CA selects an algorithmÃ : (x, y) → v, for representing a point (x, y) on E p (a, b) as a real number v.
CA publishes (d, p, q,Ã, E, G).
Key generation phase -1. CA determines its security key n ca ∈ Z * q and publishes the public key P ca = n ca G. 2. Each security class u i chooses a secret key n i ∈ Z * q , a public key P i = n i G and its encryption key K i such that the leading coefficient of the radix d expansion of K i is less than the leading coefficient of the radix d expansion of p and all coefficients of the radix d expansion of K i are not all equal. 3. u i chooses a random integer k and encrypts (K i , n i ) as a ciphertext {kG, (K i , n i ) + kP ca }, and sends this ciphertext to CA. 4. CA decrypts {kG, (K i , n i )+kP ca } to obtain (K i , n i ) by the equation
5. CA randomly choose a secret integer h i and a public integer l i . 6. CA generates the secure-filter
and publishes it. key derivation phaseWhen u j is a predecessor of u i , u j can use the secure key n j , the public key P i and the public secure-filter
Example 2. In Fig. 1 , the user set has 5 security classes denoted as S = {u 1 , · · · , u 5 }. The secure-filter of u i in our method forms as
For simplicity, we denoteÃ(n j P i ) as a i,j here and after. All secure-filters in the hierarchy S are
Security analysis
When a new predecessor u N of u i is added in hierarchy, the secure-filter of
Because h i ,h i , l i andl i can randomly be chosen by CA, we may assume
Therefore, a i,1 · · · a i,Ni are not the solutions off i (x) − f i (x) = 0 and Lin-Hsu attack fails. By comparing the coefficients of x Ni , x Ni−1 of f i (x) and the coefficients of x Ni+1 , x Ni off i (x), one has
and
where 1 ≤ s, t ≤ N i . Eq. (26) and Eq.(27) imply
Consequently,
that is,
Eq.(30) is a nonlinear equation with indeterminates a i,N , h i andh i and it is hard to solve in Z * p .
Dynamic key management
An efficient method for updating the secure-filter is the main task in dynamic access control of our proposed methods. Before discussing the problems of dynamic key management, we introduce some properties for our secure-filters.
Comparing the coefficients of each terms of f (x) and g(x), we obtain Eq. (33) and (34).
p and α i be the coefficient of the term x i of the general form
can be computed by the formulas in Theorem 1.
Proof. Since
Hence, the coefficients of
(x−h1) + 0 can be estimated by Eq.(34), and the coefficients of G 2 (x) = (x − h 2 )(G 1 (x) − 0) + 0) can be estimated by Eq.(33). Finally, we obtain the coefficients of g(x) = (x − a n+1 )(G 2 (x) − 0) + K 2 by the Eq.(33).
Corollary 2.
Under the same assumptions in Corollary 1. If h(x) = (x − h 3 )(x − a 1 ) · · · (x − a n−1 ) + K 3 is a polynomial of degree n, then the coefficient of x j of h(x) can be obtained by Theorem 1.
x−an can be evaluated by Eq. (34), the coefficients of H 2 (x) = H1(x)−0 (x−h1) can be computed by Eq. (34). And we obtain the coefficients of h(x) = (x − h 3 )(H 2 (x) − 0) + K 3 by Eq. (33).
Inserting new security class:
Assume that a new security class u r is inserted into the hierarchy such that u i < u r < u j .
1. Determine the secret information u r , K r , n r , h r , the public information P r , l r and the public secure-filter f r (x) by the steps 2-6 in key generation phase of our proposed method. 
Removing existing security classes :
Assume that an existing member u r is removed from a hierarchy (S, ≤) and S r = {u s |u r ≤ u s } is the set of all strictly predecessors of u r .
1. For each strictly predecessor u s of u r , (a) CA chooses a new secret number h s and a new public number l s randomly. (b) Update the secret filter f s by Corollary 2. 2. Delete the security class u r from the hierarchy (S, ≤) and discard the secret and public information of u r .
Example 3. In Fig. 2 , a new security class u 6 is inserted into the hierarchy S in Fig. 1 such that u 4 < u 6 < u 1 . The secure-filter of u 6 is
Since u 4 is the only strictly successor of u 6 , CA only needs to update the securefilter of u 4 . Assume that CA chooses a new secrete numberh 4 and a public numberl 4 randomly. After u 6 is inserted, the secure-filter of u 4 becomes
Now, let us compute the coefficients of this new secure-filter in Eq.(37) from the original secure-filter,(x − h 4 )(x − a 4,1 )(x − a 4,2 ) + L l4 (K 4 ), by Eqs. (33) and (34). Assume that 
